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There are three great options in the philosophy of nature: materialism, 
cosmic monism, and plural holism. These correspond to the metaphysi-
cal priority of, respectively, the very small, the very large, and the inter-
mediate. Human beings and other organisms fall into the intermediate 
category. I will argue in Section 2 that a philosophy of nature that gives 
pride of place to thought and responsible, intentional action, while avoid-
ing Cartesian dualism and idealism, must embrace the Aristotelian option 
of plural holism (Inman 2018).
Before turning to the details of contemporary quantum science, I will 
sketch the basic requirements of an Aristotelian pluralism in Section 3. 
Aristotelian philosophy of nature maintains a unique balance between 
top-down (formal) and bottom-up (material) modes of explanation. This 
balance requires the use of a repertoire of basic Aristotelian concepts, 
including proximate and prime matter, substantial form, quantitative 
accidents, and integral and virtual parts.
The greatest challenge to the viability of Aristotelian natural philosophy 
comes from the apparent atomism of modern science since the Scientific 
Revolution. I will argue in Section 4 that the discovery of the quantum 
world in the early twentieth century effected a kind of Aristotelian coun-
ter-revolution, displacing the ostensible atomism of the Newton-Maxwell 
model with an irreducible holism, a holism that is most apparent in quan-
tum chemistry and thermodynamics. Consequently, I will argue in Section 
5 that the world according to a neo-Aristotelian framework should consist 
of living organisms and what I shall call ‘thermal substances’ (along with 
remnants of these). In that section I will develop the theory of thermal 
(inorganic) substances in some detail, addressing the questions of their 
origin and individuation.
With the theory of thermal substances in place, I will be able to turn 
to an account of the world of organisms in Section 6. We will see there 
that thermal substances serve as virtual parts and as proximate matter 





Thermochemical and Biological Powers 67
causation by the souls or substantial forms of living organisms, avoiding 
some of the difficulties of Cartesian interactionism. In Section 7, I discuss 
how an Aristotelian philosophy of nature will enable us to rehabilitate 
what Wilfred Sellars called the manifest image of the world (Sellars 1962), 
undergirding the veridicality and reliability of human observation and 
experimentation.
2.  The Three Options in the Philosophy of Nature
Aristotle’s metaphysics clearly assigns the status of fundamental to living 
organisms, despite their intermediate size. Organisms are neither mere 
heaps of atoms nor mere fragments of the whole cosmos. They are instead 
among the primary beings of the world – the things that have unity and 
exist in the strictest, most central sense.
Since the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, a kind of 
philosophical atomism has tended to dominate our understanding of 
nature. On this view, the power and nature of any composite material 
entity depends on the powers, natures, and mutual arrangements and 
motions of the smallest bits of matter. This would seem to leave no 
room for genuine human agency, as Plato recognized in the Phaedo 
(98c–99b). The agency of the particles leaves nothing for reason or 
free will to do, except in a subordinate and derived way. The atom-
istic materialist cannot find a place in the world for genuine rational 
powers, a kind of fundamental responsiveness of the human mind to 
reasons and evidence.1
In response, many theists have embraced a kind interactionist dualism 
or some form of idealism or cosmic holism (e.g., Rowan Williams – see 
Pickstock 2015), trying to carve out real space for the domain of reason. 
However, there are severe theological and apologetic costs to these dualist 
and idealist stratagems. Both dualists and idealists must posit a prob-
lematic explanatory gap between natural phenomena and our internal 
sensations or “phenomenal qualia” (Levine 2000). The prospects for any 
simple, law-like relationship between microphysical properties and sen-
sory qualia are extremely dim, as noted by Robert Adams (1987). Instead, 
we are left with massively gerrymandered and anomalous correlations 
between physical conditions and experiential qualities, correlations that 
can never be illuminated by causal mechanisms. Dualists and idealists 
also face difficult questions about how spiritual realities can interact with 
physical processes without violating physical symmetries and conserva-
tion laws. Dualists and idealists seem to be stuck with a fruitless quest for 
some elusive vital force (élan vital) by which the mind can move funda-
mental particles (see Lowe 1992). Ethically, dualists and idealists run the 
risk of downplaying the importance of bodily integrity, since they make 
the human body wholly extrinsic to the human person as such (see, for 
example, Lee and George 2009).
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If we set aside dualism and idealism as problematic and implausible, 
then we are forced to choose between the three remaining options: atom-
ism, monism, and pluralism. Atomists hold that only extremely small 
entities, like subatomic particles or point-intensities of fields, can be meta-
physically fundamental, while monists (like Jonathan Schaffer) take that 
there is only one fundamental entity, the entire cosmos (Schaffer 2010). 
Pluralists assume that we can find fundamental entities at many different 
scales of size, including intermediate-sized entities like living organisms. 
From a traditional theistic point of view, there are at least three reasons 
for favoring pluralism: preserving human agency, securing our knowledge 
of necessary and normative truths, and buttressing the teleological argu-
ment for God’s existence.
First, both physical monism and atomism threaten human agency. If 
reason is to have any power, the human being must be capable (sans 
reason) to arrive at more than one conclusion (whether theoretical or 
practical). And which alternative conclusion we do reach must be explain-
able in terms of our reasons and acts of will – it cannot be exhaustively 
explained at either the atomic or the cosmic level without introducing 
an implausible coincidence of overdetermination, that is, an ad hoc, pre-
established harmony between the material and the rational (of the sort 
proposed by Gottfried Leibniz).
Second, for the same reason, monism and atomism threaten human 
epistemology. Our non-empirical knowledge of necessary facts requires 
that those facts have some direct impact on our faculty of intuition. The 
intuitions we form must not be explainable in terms of processes at the 
atomic or cosmic level, processes with no real, constitutive connection to 
the relevant necessary facts. This is especially problematic for our knowl-
edge of purely normative facts, since normative facts seem to play no role 
in determining the nature or movements of either material atoms or the 
physical cosmos as a whole. Any morality with an intellectual compo-
nent (anything, that is, beyond the most voluntarist of divine command 
or social-convention theories) requires both real human agency and real 
knowledge of normative reasons (see Koons 2017, 2019b).
Third, Aristotelian pluralism provides strong grounds for inferring the 
existence of a transcendent Creator, as exemplified by Thomas Aquinas’s 
Fifth Way (see Feser 2008, 110–119). To be viable, pluralism must reject 
Humean doubts about causation, embracing a robust realism about causal 
powers. As pluralists, Aristotelians attribute such robust causal powers to 
composite material substances, including living organisms. Causal powers 
correspond to teleological structures, since each causal power is intrinsi-
cally ordered to a particular result. If there are fundamental causal powers 
possessed by living organisms, then those powers define a distinctively 
biological teleology.
These causal powers must themselves be explained in terms of the 
natures or essences of these composite substances. These natures must 
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somehow be imposed upon appropriate material parts or components. 
Hence, there must be compatibility between the material requirements 
of the biological essences and the attributes of inorganic material things. 
Otherwise, it would be impossible for living things to grow, develop, 
or reproduce. For example, there must be a compatibility between inor-
ganic substances (like water, O2, CO2, or various mineral salts) and the 
substance of living organisms like plants, a compatibility that enables 
the latter to absorb and integrate the former. Moreover, there must be an 
adequate causal explanation of why these particular biological essences 
are actually imposed upon parts of the natural world. Even if, as Aristo-
tle supposed, all of the species of organisms had been exemplified from 
eternity past, we would still need an explanation for the imposition of 
these specific essences on those particular streams of material substrate. 
We would still need to know the ground for the existence of any living 
things at all. Given, as we now know, that life is a relatively late arrival, 
the need for an adequate cause of its emergence becomes especially acute.
Darwinian natural selection, even if correct as an explanation of the 
generation of new species, falls short of providing a metaphysically 
sufficient explanation of this fact (see Stephen Boulter’s chapter in this 
volume). Evolution can describe how the life-engendering powers of the 
natural world came to be exercised and in what order they were exercised, 
but it cannot explain why those powers are there in the first place. Given 
the metaphysical fundamentality of organisms, we cannot hope to explain 
the origin or development of life simply by describing possible trajectories 
of the constituent particles. Even if matter fell by chance into optimal 
spatial arrangements and mutual motions, it wouldn’t thereby constitute 
an Aristotelian substance. And given the non-eternity of species, possible 
future species must exist in the mind of something like a Craftsman, in 
the way that the form of a house is present in the mind of an architect.
3.  Building a Pluralist Philosophy of Nature
Building a pluralist philosophy of nature is not a trivial task. Pluralists 
must make room in the world for both top-down explanation (explaining 
parts in terms of wholes) and bottom-up explanation (explaining wholes 
in terms of parts), while atomists and monists need only one or the other 
mode. For pluralists, the world consists of substances, fragments of sub-
stances, and heaps of substances. For atomists, the world consists only 
of substances and heaps, while for the monist it consists only of a single 
substance and its fragments.
Moreover, it is clear that many substances (like organisms) interact 
with their environment through their parts. Hence, the powers of the 
whole substance must in some way be dependent on the disposition of 
those parts. In addition, the very survival of a substance depends on the 
appropriate cooperation of its parts. At the same time, there must be 
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something that unifies those parts (and just those parts) into a single sub-
stance. For Aristotelians, this something is known as a substantial form. 
Each substance has a single substantial form that makes it what it is and 
that unifies its parts, both at a time and through time.2 The substantial 
form of a substance does not simply consist in the nature of its parts and 
their mutual arrangement in space – it is that which ultimately grounds 
and explains those natures and that arrangement.
For composite, material substances, substantial form cannot be the 
whole story. There must also be that on which the substantial form 
operates. This is the substance’s matter. The primary metaphysical role 
of matter is that of individuation. Chunks of matter individuate a sub-
stance and its parts from substances and parts of the same natural kind. 
They ground the mutual distinctness of things that are specifically the 
same (the same in kind). This individuating role is what gives the Aris-
totelian a unique and attractive account of natural sameness (see Brower 
2017; Koons 2018b). If we consider matter in its pure function as a 
bare individuator, we arrive at the concept of prime matter. A chunk of 
prime matter has no positive nature, quality, or quantity of its own. It 
simply individuates its substance or part of a substance from others of 
the same kind.3
However, prime matter is never wholly on its own and so never actually 
bare. It is always of necessity informed by a substantial form, and this 
informing results in various layers of what is called proximate matter. 
The human being, for example, is obviously composed of various kinds 
of tissue, such as bone, muscle, skin, and blood. Each chunk of tissue cor-
responds to a chunk of prime matter, but a chunk that has been natured 
and qualified by the human being’s one substantial form. Each piece of 
proximate matter is composed of parts of more elementary, less proximate 
kinds of matter. Such intermediate forms of matter in a living organism 
include proteins, lipids, and carbohydrates, which in turn are composed 
of still less proximate matter, like carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, with the 
most elemental forms of matter (protons, neutrons, electrons) constituting 
a layer just “above” that of prime matter. It is the one substantial form 
of the human being (the human soul) that is responsible for the character 
of each of these layers of matter above the level of prime matter, but 
each level has an important role to play in explaining the persistence and 
varying powers of the whole substance. The explanatory role that these 
layers play is called material causation. The substantial form plays the 
complementary role of formal causation.
Given the critical role that substantial form must play in the Aristote-
lian framework, it is impossible for one substance to contain another or 
even to overlap another substance. Substances in the Aristotelian scheme 
satisfy what Jonathan Schaffer calls the tiling constraint (Schaffer 2010). 
The material universe consists entirely of non-overlapping substances 
(and remnants of these). Parts of substances, therefore, cannot be actual 
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substances themselves. Their natures or identities (or both) are inextrica-
bly tied to the whole substance of which they are a part.
Given the tiling constraint, all parts of substances must be either inte-
gral parts or virtual parts. An integral part of a substance is a part whose 
whole nature and individual identity is tied to that substance. My hand, 
for example, is essentially a hand, so essentially a part of a human being. 
Integral substances can sometimes exist independently of their “host” 
substance, but they persist only as remnants of that substance and never as 
substances in their own right. Their natures are such that it is metaphysi-
cally impossible for an integral part to exist except as a part or a remnant 
of a particular substance. Their individual identities are irrevocably tied 
to the organism from which they originated.
In contrast, virtual parts of a substance have intrinsic natures that are 
independent of the whole. This does not violate the unicity of substan-
tial form, since the virtual parts have only potential existence within the 
whole substance. Moreover, the fact that this inorganic substance can 
exist as a virtual part of the organism is grounded in the organism’s own 
substantial form.
For any virtual part of a substance, there are many empirically indis-
tinguishable counterparts existing as actual substances in their own right 
and not as mere virtual parts. The water in my veins, for example, cor-
responds chemically and thermodynamically to batches of water existing 
in the inorganic world as actual, independent substances. In this case the 
tiling constraint is satisfied by stipulating that the virtual part no longer 
has actual existence while part of my body. It exists only potentially, con-
tributing to the persistence and powers of my body but not constituting 
at the same time a distinct substance. For this reason, none of the water 
in my veins can be numerically identical to any inorganic sample of water 
that I ingested, since the inorganic water was a substance in its own right 
and not merely a virtual part of another substance. This transmutation of 
inorganic substances into virtual parts and vice versa is an unavoidable 
theoretical cost of the hylomorphic picture, but it is a cost well worth 
paying.
The structured parts of a substance (e.g., organs and tissues of the 
living body) are its integral parts, while the kinds of stuffs contained by 
the substance (water, lipids, proteins, nucleic acids) are or correspond to 
virtual parts.
Aristotelian natural philosophy includes the reification of certain fea-
tures of substances – the accidents. These accidents are abstract particu-
lars, corresponding to the modes or tropes of modern metaphysics. Each 
particular accident is simultaneously both a real entity, tied essentially to 
a single subject, and a feature of that subject. So, Socrates’s musicality is 
a classic example of such an accident. It is that by which Socrates is musi-
cal. The accident is ontologically dependent on Socrates, and it exactly 
resembles other instances of the same kind, such as Plato’s musicality. 
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These individual accidents can themselves be generated and corrupted, 
and they enter into other causal and explanatory relations.
The very fact that substances have parts of any kind is the responsibility 
of the substantial form. The substantial form is responsible both for pro-
viding its integral parts with their natures and with transmuting external 
inorganic substances into its virtual parts. Substantial form also imposes 
forms of quantity on batches of prime matter – so-called quantitative acci-
dents of volume, mass, and relative position. These quantitative accidents 
stand in part-whole relations to one another. For example, the location 
of my left elbow is contained within the location of my left arm. These 
quantitative accidents are responsible for the possibility of my body’s hav-
ing quantitative or material parts, both integral and virtual. The identities 
of these quantitative accidents have a dual anchor: in the first place, to 
the particular substances to which they belong, in the second place, to 
the particular packet of prime matter that they inform. It is because the 
quantitative accidents are tied inextricably to the individual identity of 
the substance to which they belong that all integral parts of the substance 
are similarly so tied.
4.  The Case for Thermal Substances
Integrating this Aristotelian natural philosophy with modern science faces 
the problem of the inorganic world. Aristotelians will always count living 
organisms among the world’s substances. Given the tiling constraint, the 
sum total of substances and their remnants must together constitute the 
whole of the material world. It is clear that organisms alone cannot fit 
this bill. Much of the world is not and never has been part of any living 
organism. Where can we find the fundamental Aristotelian substances in 
that inorganic world, needed to complete the plural holist picture? I will 
argue that we can take our cues from the holistic character of quantum 
chemistry and thermodynamics. I have developed and defended a theory 
of thermal substances in some recent work (Koons 2018a, 2019a, 2021), 
building on the pioneering work on quantum chemistry by the theoreti-
cal chemist Hans Primas (1980, 1981), and William M. R. Simpson very 
ably lays out the case for the existence of such substances in the preceding 
chapter and in his doctoral thesis (Simpson 2019), building on the recent 
proposal of contextual wave function collapse by the cosmologist George 
Ellis and the physicist Barbara Drossel (Drossel 2015; Ellis and Drossel 
2018).
On this picture, none of the entities described in so-called fundamental 
physics are in fact fundamental; that is, none of them are Aristotelian 
substances. Instead, quarks, electrons, photons, and the rest have merely 
virtual presence in true material substances.
Quantum theory provides a fertile field for the theory of Aristotelian 
accidents. However, we cannot identify particles with accidents in a 
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one-to-one fashion. Rather, it is pluralities of indistinguishable particles 
(which I will call congeries) that are to be identified with Aristotelian 
accidents. In standard interpretations of quantum theory (in fact, all the 
interpretations except the Bohmian one),4 particles lack determinate and 
enduring identities. Both Dirac-Fermi and Einstein-Bose statistics treat 
elementary particles as mere figures in an accounting book, like dollars 
in the bank, rather than as enduring nodes of possibility, reidentifiable as 
particular individuals at different times and in varying possible scenarios 
(see the chapters in Part I in Castellani 1998, and Redhead and Teller 
1991). In nearly all situations, particles lack location and many intrinsic 
properties (like momentum or spin). In fact, the location of a particle 
(when not actually measured) cannot be considered to be determinately 
restricted to any finite region of space (Clifton and Halvorson 2001). 
And the actual number of particles in a system is not an absolute fact but 
depends on one’s frame of reference (Fraser 2008).
Each congeries of indistinguishable particles is, nonetheless, a real 
entity, but an entity that is ontologically dependent on the thermal sub-
stance that contains it. Such congeries of particles correspond with the 
thermal substance’s power of affecting and being affected by other thermal 
substances at the quantum level. An individual particle is fully actualized 
when such an interaction occurs. At that moment, the individual particle 
exists as a distinct individual – an individual accident in the category of 
action or passion.
A congeries of indistinguishable particles is a virtual quantitative part 
of a thermal substance, corresponding to a quantitative accident. In tra-
ditional Aristotelianism, a solid bronze sphere has a top half that cor-
responds with a certain hemispheric accident of quantity. So, a congeries 
of indistinguishable particles, as a quantitative accident of the thermal 
substance, corresponds to a virtual quantitative part of that thermal sub-
stance. Such congeries are analogous to the quantities of elements (earth, 
water, air, fire) that existed virtually in Aristotle’s theory of mixtures (in 
On Generation and Corruption, Book 1). A congeries of particles is onto-
logically dependent on the thermal substance and not an actual substance 
in its own right. It doesn’t exist in full actuality but only in virtue of the 
power of the substance to act and be acted on in certain ways. In its virtual 
presence in the substance, a congeries of quantum particles counts as a 
virtual part of the proximate matter of that substance – again, analogous 
to the way that elemental quantities counted in Aristotle’s chemistry.
The substantial form of the whole thermal substance is responsible 
for the existence, nature, and mutual combination of the quantal enti-
ties that make up its proximate matter. At the same time, the result-
ing proximate quantum-level matter must satisfy certain conditions 
for the whole substance to persist and to have the contingent powers 
that it does have. Hence, there is a legitimate place for bottom-up 
material explanation in the Aristotelian scheme. We can partly explain 
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the persistence of a substance and its actions upon and reactions to its 
environment in terms of the powers and potentialities corresponding 
to its quantum constituents. There are two complementary modes of 
explanation: material and formal, and both are prior to the usual expla-
nation in terms of efficient causation, which is invoked in explaining 
the production of changes.
This theory of thermal substances and their quantum accidents agrees 
with Niels Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics on 
two points: the incompleteness of the quantum-level description of the 
world and the existence of definite states within the complementary “clas-
sical” world. I differ with Bohr, however, in refusing to separate reality 
into two disjoint domains (quantal and classical). Instead, the world con-
sists of thermal substances and their virtual quantal parts. Each thermal 
substance has both classical and quantal properties. The classical proper-
ties form a non-trivial core or center of mutually commutable observables, 
defining super-selection sectors (Primas 1980, 1981). These classical prop-
erties never enter into quantum superpositions. In contrast, the disjoint 
class of quantal properties are typically found in superposed states, with 
non-trivial probabilities assigned to the constituents of orthogonal bases 
of observables. Two quantal properties do not typically commute, since 
they belong to the same super-selection sector.
The theory of thermal substances denies the completeness of the micro-
physical. One important aspect of the scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was its emphasis on what Aristotelians 
would label material causation and explanation through hypothetical 
necessity. If large systems are to behave as they are observed to do, they 
must be composed of parts with intrinsic natures and mutual arrange-
ments in space that are capable of sustaining the observed collective 
behavior. From an Aristotelian point of view, this analytic approach is 
perfectly legitimate. It is illuminating to learn that water is composed 
(virtually) of H2O molecules, and that cells contain (virtually) double 
helices of DNA.
Where microphysicalism went wrong was in insisting that macroscopic 
phenomena can be exhaustively explained in terms of microphysical facts. 
Microphysicalists assume that all facts supervene on the microphysical 
entities and their arrangements in space. This is true both of atomists 
of various kinds and those who believe that matter is infinitely divisible, 
like Empedocles or Descartes. The motions of large bodies depend on 
their composition and the motions of those components, and not vice 
versa. On this view, all true explanation on this view is bottom-up, from 
the very small to the large, and never top-down. This means that for the 
microphysicalist, there can be no room for substantial form – with one 
possible exception. If there are fundamental, indivisible particles, they and 
they alone could have substantial forms. Anti-atomists like Descartes or 
Empedocles must reject substantial forms altogether, since on their view 
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there are no true unities in nature, merely various uniform and infinitely 
divisible continua.
In any case, on this view, neither people nor organisms more generally 
nor any of the many things that we can perceive have substantial forms 
at all. Consequently, microphysicalists must deny the reality of all the 
so-called secondary qualities, such as color, smell, or taste, since these, if 
they existed, would be accidents of macroscopic substances.
Long before the quantum revolution, this anti-realism about the “mani-
fest image” of the world (to use Wilfred Sellars’s phrase) threatened to 
undermine the scientific enterprise itself, since all of our observations and 
experimental results presuppose the real existence of, well, observations 
and experiments, neither of which can easily be accommodated within a 
microphysicalist image of the world. Experiments require experimental 
conditions or setups, and these are definable only in macroscopic terms. 
If the macroscopic world is merely a world of misleading appearances, 
how are experiments possible?
So, there were always grounds for suspicion about the microphysical-
ist picture, but the success for so long of what is now called “classical 
physics,” the physics of Newton and Maxwell, and even of the theories 
of relativity, suggested that such a picture must be true, whatever its 
philosophical and epistemological conundrums, and that we just need 
sufficient imagination to see how. This presumption of ultimate coher-
ence changes dramatically with the quantum revolution. The revolution 
has not perhaps made microphysicalism completely untenable, but it has 
clearly put it on the defensive and opened up the live possibility of resur-
recting substantial forms at macroscopic scales, including the scale of 
human beings and other organisms.
Any quantum theory of chemistry and thermodynamics must come to 
grips with the Stone-von Neumann theorem, proved by Marshall Stone 
and John von Neumann in 1931 (von Neumann 1931). The theorem 
states that any two “irreducible representations” of the canonical commu-
tation relations of quantum theory are unitarily equivalent, whenever the 
system contains only finitely many degrees of freedom. Any two n-param-
eter systems are, therefore, unitarily equivalent. Unitary equivalence is 
taken, in quantum theory, to represent macroscopic indistinguishability. 
When using finite quantum representations, there could be no difference 
at the macroscopic scale in chemical composition, or phase state of matter 
(solid, liquid, gas), or entropy. This would seem to make chemistry and 
thermodynamics impossible.
Practicing quantum theorists avoid this negative result by taking their 
models to the thermodynamic limit (Liu 1999; Bangu 2009; Sewell 2002). 
Such models represent the macrophysical state of a substance as con-
sisting of an infinite number of infinitesimal particles. In this way, they 
can escape the constraints of the Stone-von-Neumann theorem, which 
applies only to finite systems. It is only at the thermodynamic limit, also 
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known as the ‘continuum limit’ (Compagner 1989), that the models have 
enough internal structure to distinguish different chemical compounds 
and different phases of matter. And only at that limit can we give rigor-
ous definitions of central notions in the physics of complex systems like 
temperature and entropy.
There are three reasons for taking models to unrealistic limits. The first 
two are purely fictional: namely, using an unrealistic model because it 
makes calculations simpler, or because doing so enables us to ignore rela-
tively insignificant factors (like friction or gravity). The continuum limit 
of quantum thermodynamics exemplifies a third reason: because only the 
unrealistic model contains the sort of mathematical structure needed to 
represent the phenomena faithfully.
When we use an unrealistic model for the third reason, the model cap-
tures some truth that a more “realistic” model of the same kind could 
not in principle capture. This is exactly what we should expect in the 
presence of substantial form. The substantial form imposes a structure 
on the whole system that cannot in principle be explained by the system’s 
parts and their arrangement, given a system with only a finite number 
of fundamental particles. The need for an infinite model reflects a gap 
in the bottom-up explanation of the phenomenon in question. Only the 
presence of a top-down explanans (that is, the form) can account for the 
inadequacy of the finite models.
The use of infinite models in quantum statistical mechanics exactly 
realizes a hylomorphic model of explanation, with its inclusion of two 
complementary modes of explanation, namely, formal and material. The 
fact that the models are derived by taking finite models of the quantum 
components of the system to the infinite limit represents the role of mate-
rial causation. In modeling the behavior of a body of water, we begin with 
a finite model of water molecules (with the appropriate numbers of pro-
tons, neutrons, and electrons). The fact that we must take these models to 
an “unrealistic” limit (with an infinite number of infinitesimal molecules) 
represents the role of formal causation. Material causation cannot fully 
account for the system’s thermodynamic properties.
Substantial form is also responsible for the chemical composition of 
substances. The geometrical structure of molecules cannot be captured 
by quantum mechanics in the absence of the method of taking models to 
the thermodynamic/continuum limit. It is true that, once we have the geo-
metrical structure (as revealed by experiment), we can use finite quantum 
models to explain the stability of that structure. This is just what hylomor-
phists would expect. Finite quantum models provide the material mode 
of explanation – they explain how stable chemical forms are possible. 
However, quantum theory in that simple form cannot give us the formal 
explanation of the molecular structure. Finite quantum models, unlike 
the corresponding models of classical mechanics, cannot explain spon-
taneous symmetry breaking. Such breaking of symmetries occurs only 
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in the “unrealistic” models at the thermodynamic limit (Woolley 1988; 
Strocchi 1985, 117–118; Ruetsche 2006; Earman 2004). Therefore, all 
asymmetric chemical structure, like the left-handedness of organic amino 
acids, must be imposed from above, by substantial form (Woolley 1988; 
Hendry 2010).
At the level of microphysics, there is no true irreversibility or direction 
to time. Any purely quantum transition can be reversed in time, so long 
as we reserve electric charge and parity (left- and right-handedness) at the 
same time. There is, therefore, no microphysical process that is intrinsi-
cally directed toward the future. If, however, we accept thermodynam-
ics as a fundamental science applying to thermal substances (Prigogine 
1997), then the Second Law of Thermodynamics (the monotonic increase 
in entropy) gives us an objective, fundamental, and intrinsic direction in 
time associated with every actual motion. And this gives us natural teleol-
ogy, as systems naturally seek their equilibrium state. The sum total of 
quantum-level facts does not fix the direction of time, but the substantial 
forms of thermal substances do.
Thus, quantum thermodynamics and chemistry provide us with 
examples in which the macroscopic features of the system do not 
supervene on and therefore cannot be exhaustively explained by the 
microphysical facts. That is, we could have two situations that are 
microphysically indistinguishable and yet chemically and thermody-
namically different. Consequently, these chemical differences cannot 
in principle be explained exhaustively at the microphysical level. An 
adequate science of matter needs to combine bottom-up (material) 
and top-down (formal) modes of explanation. The result is not a radi-
cal form of theoretical pluralism or the disunity of science, since, as 
quantum thermodynamics demonstrates, we can combine both modes 
in a single model.
In fact, even apart from these considerations about quantum chem-
istry and thermodynamics, pure quantum theory itself (in the form of 
Schrödinger or matrix dynamics) indicates the incompleteness of the 
quantum domain, as recognized by Niels Bohr. The predictions of quan-
tum dynamics all take the form of probabilities, but probabilities of what? 
The standard answer (following Bohr) is: the probability of measure-
ment results. But what are measurements, and how do they have definite 
results? This leads to what is known as the measurement problem or 
measurement paradox.
A quantum measurement consists in an interaction between a human 
experimenter, various experimental materials (instruments, laboratory 
setups, and the like), and a source of quantum particles. But macroscopic 
entities (like experimenters and their instruments) are themselves entirely 
composed of quantum particles, and so quantum dynamics should apply 
to them as well. This leads to an infinite regress: probabilities of prob-
abilities of probabilities, ad infinitum.
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The famous thought experiment of Schrödinger’s cat illustrates the first 
step of the paradox. If the cat is poised to observe some quantum mea-
surement, and if we treat the cat itself as a quantum system, then the inter-
action between the cat and the quantum phenomenon (say, an electron 
that could go either up or down) will yield no definite result. Instead, the 
electron will begin in a superposed Up/Down state, and the cat will come 
to be in a superposed Observe-up/Observe-down state, until we open the 
box and observe what the cat has actually observed. But the observer of 
the cat could be treated as yet another quantum system, resulting in an 
infinite regress.
Aristotelian pluralists deny that macroscopic entities like human experi-
menters and their instruments can be represented adequately by finite 
quantum models. Thermal substances have classical, mutually commuting 
properties, like chemical composition, temperature, and phase of matter, 
properties that never enter into quantum superpositions. When a quan-
tum power interacts with a thermal substance and produces a change in 
classical properties, a “measurement” has occurred with a definite result.
I can illustrate the hylomorphic solution to the measurement paradox 
by introducing the thought experiment of Schrödinger’s ice cube. We put 
an ice cube in a box, and attach it to a system that responds to some 
quantum-level event, an event in a 50/50 superposed state. If the system 
results in an Up event, the ice cube melted, and if it results in Down 
event, the ice cube remains frozen. Now the ice cube is entirely com-
posed of protons, neutrons, and electrons, and so it is subject to quantum 
modeling. However, the ice cube is a thermal substance, and so it has a 
substantial form that imposes a phase of matter (namely, solidity) upon 
those particles. The distinction between two phases of matter occurs only 
at the level of form – it is not determined by the quantum state of the 
constituent particles. Consequently, it is impossible for a cube to be in 
a Frozen/Unfrozen superposed state. Such a state simply does not exist. 
So, we can define a measurement event to be an event involving non-
quantal properties (accidents) of substances. Whenever a quantum system 
produces such an event, a “measurement” occurs, regardless of whether 
the substance is an organism or merely a thermal substance (like an ice 
cube). Consciousness need not be involved, and so we escape idealism. 
This account, I suggest, is consistent with the contextual wave function 
collapse model put forward by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George 
Ellis (Drossel 2015; Ellis and Drossel 2018), and discussed by William M. 
R. Simpson in Chapter 1.
For the hylomorphist, thermal substances and organisms have definite 
positions in space at each moment in time, even if none of their quan-
tum components do. Each quantum particle is, except for the moment in 
which its position is measured, located vaguely everywhere, with a certain, 
finite probability (Clifton and Halvorson 2001). Thermal substances and 
organisms, in contrast, have a definite, actual location at each moment. 
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Individual quantum particles are really just momentary accidents of sub-
stances, and so the locations of the particles do not fix the location of 
the substance. When not actualized by measurement, individual quantum 
particles are merely powers of interaction, typically non-localized powers. 
Congeries of such particles (in which the particles lack individual identi-
ties) are virtual parts of the substance.
Bohr was right in thinking that quantum mechanics indicates the 
incompleteness of the quantum world. But he was wrong (at least, as he 
is commonly interpreted) in thinking that the two domains could be kept 
separate through a dualism of objects or entities. I speculate that this mis-
take results from unfamiliarity with the hylomorphic solution, in which 
congeries of quantum particles act as the virtual proximate matter for 
non-quantal forms. We now know that even macroscopic objects can have 
quantal aspects – for example, superconductors and supercooled fluids, 
which exemplify exotic behavior thanks to quantum coherence effects. 
Hylomorphists are not committed to a dichotomous quantum/classical 
dualism but to a system in which complementary entities (namely, sub-
stances and accidents, form and matter) coexist in mutual dependency.
Prompted by the urging of John Bell (1987), defenders of microphysi-
calism have sought an alternative strategy for resolving the measurement 
paradox. These efforts have led to revived interest in Everett’s many-
worlds interpretation, David Bohm’s pilot-wave interpretation, and a 
family of objective bottom-up collapse theories, including the Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory.5 These various microphysicalist reactions 
to the paradox explain why we have a multiplicity of “interpretations” 
of quantum theory. There was no such plurality of ontological interpreta-
tions of Newton and Maxwell – those theories seemed to point clearly to 
the truth of microphysicalism. Quantum theory no longer does so. Saving 
microphysicalism requires ad hoc supplementation.
Now, no one can be forced by quantum mechanics to embrace hylo-
morphism. Nonetheless, the hylomorphic rejection of microphysicalism 
preserves the simplest and most natural interpretation of the quantum 
formalism. It is well supported by the use of the thermodynamic limit in 
chemistry and thermodynamics, as required by the Stone-von-Neumann 
theorem. Unlike the other interpretations, hylomorphism does not require 
any ad hoc modifications or unverifiable additions, and it accords best 
with the actual practice of scientists. Practicing quantum scientists, like 
everyone else, are implicit Aristotelians, as the philosopher of science 
Nancy Cartwright (1994, 1999) has argued since the 1990s.
5.  The World of Thermal Substances
A quantitative part of a substance is a part in a very ordinary familiar 
way, as a finger or a particular pint of blood are parts of an individual 
organism. The substantial form and the so-called prime matter of the 
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substance, as well as the accidents of a substance, in contrast, are not 
quantitative parts. Individual quantum particles are, somewhat surpris-
ingly, also not quantitative parts of thermal substances. Instead, they are 
merely potential accidents of quantitative parts. Unlike quantitative parts, 
individual quantum particles have no persisting particular identities. A 
congeries of indistinguishable particles belonging to a single thermal sub-
stance constitutes a virtual quantitative part of that substance and so part 
of that substance’s proximate matter. Such virtual parts may be said to 
have a real but derived identity as persisting, re-identifiable parts of the 
substance.
The tiling constraint dictates that no substance can have other actual 
substances as quantitative parts. To do so would fatally compromise the 
per se unity of the containing substance. The requirements of per se unity 
of the composite substance are so great that we have to think of the 
quantitative parts as also metaphysically dependent on the whole, and 
not vice versa. As a result, Aristotelians are committed to what has been 
called the Homonymy Principle: no quantitative part of a substance can 
exist except as a part of that substance.
Can either accidents or quantitative parts of substances persist 
beyond the demise of their substances? Accidents and quantitative 
parts are dependent in some way on their host substances, but does 
this dependence rule out the possibility of their extended survival? 
Thomas Aquinas wrote (In Metaphysica, VII, L8, 1459) that substance 
is the ‘active principle’ of accidents. It is impossible for accidents to 
be prior to substances ‘in definition (ratio), time, or generation’ (op. 
cit. L13, 1579). Accidents do not have ‘perfect being (esse perfectum)’ 
unless they exist in a subject (L9, 1477). Priority in time means that 
no accident or part can exist before its substance. Priority in definition 
means that the identity of the accident or part is derived from that 
of its subject. This non-priority of accidents in both time and defini-
tion seems compatible, however, with some accidents continuing to 
exist after their substances have been destroyed. In one case, as is well 
known, Aquinas explicitly affirmed the possibility of the persistence 
of accidents in the absence of their subjects: the accidents of the Host 
in the Eucharist (Summa Theologica, Part III, q77 a1). If my theory 
of thermal substances is correct, this kind of survival of accidents is 
actually quite common even within the natural order and does not 
demand any ad hoc metaphysics.
I have argued elsewhere (Koons 2020) that there are good grounds 
within Aristotelian philosophy for positing that accidents in the category 
of action can readily survive separation from and the demise of their 
substantial host. For instance, Aristotle describes the archer’s accident of 
action surviving in the arrow throughout its flight, and presumably this 
would be true even if the archer died while the arrow was in flight. This 
is extremely relevant, since quantum particles are also accidents in the 
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category of action. A quantum particle represents a way in which one 
thermal substance can act upon another.
As we’ve seen, both accidents and quantitative parts have a dual depen-
dence on their substances. Every accident or part must receive its existence 
at some point in time from a substance. Second, each accident or part is 
individuated by its substance. No two congeries of particles of the same 
kind are fundamentally or primitively distinct from each other. Instead, if 
they have real distinctness, they derive that distinctness from the numeri-
cal distinctness of their substances (Brower 2017; Koons 2018b). This 
means that the individual identity of each particle or collectivity of par-
ticles is essentially tied to that of a particular substance (thermal substance 
or organism). Consequently, no particle or collectivity of particles can 
be transferred from one substance to another. Once a quantum particle 
has interacted with a thermal substance, its individual identity has come 
to an end. However, as I’ve argued, that does not rule out the possibility 
of an individual particle’s continuing to exist beyond the demise of its 
substance.
The theory of thermal substances satisfies a version of the tiling 
constraint. The material world consists entirely of disjoint actual sub-
stances and remnants of such substances, along with their accidents. 
No two actual substances overlap, and so the plurality of actual sub-
stances (including remnants of extinct substances) constitutes a set of 
mutually disjoint entities that collectively exhaust the whole material 
universe.
Every actual entity in the world is either (i) a substance, (ii) an accident 
of a substance, (iii) a fragment or remnant of a substance, or (iv) a group 
or (v) a heap of substances and fragments.6 The five categories can be 
distinguished based on their degree of unity. A substance has absolute or 
per se unity. An accident, fragment (a quantitative part), or remnant of a 
substance has a similar degree of unity, but one that is dependent on the 
unity of the whole substance. A group of substances has what Thomas 
Aquinas called the unity of order, an imperfect form of unity. A heap has 
the lowest degree of unity – the unity of contact or contiguity.
A group has greater unity than a mere heap, but less than that of a true 
substance. When substances form a group, the members gain novel causal 
powers, both active and passive, through membership. Like substances, 
facts about groups are not reducible to intrinsic facts about their members 
and the members’ spatiotemporal relations. In addition, like a substance, 
a group can persist despite a changing roll of members. There are two 
key differences between groups and substances. First, a group does not so 
absorb its members in such a way that the members cannot belong simul-
taneously to several groups, while no material entity can belong at the 
same time to two distinct substances. Some but not all of the irreducible 
powers of the members are grounded by the nature of the group. Second, 
the team cannot undergo any intrinsic change except via change of some 
82 Robert C. Koons
of its members, while substances can undergo change as a whole, with the 
implications of the change percolating downward to the parts.
It is clear that organisms can form groups. Human beings form a bewil-
dering variety of social groups and institutions. Many other animals also 
work together in analogous social structures. I would conjecture that 
inorganic thermal substances can also cooperate in group-like structures. 
Stable patterns seen in phenomena like Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells 
(Drazin and Reid 2004), whirlpools (Steward 2012, 241), the water cycle 
(Oderberg 2006), hurricanes, stars, and certain kinds of planets may indi-
cate such irreducible collective behavior, which nonetheless falls short of 
the per se unity of substances (see Anderson 1972; Laughlin 2005).
Since developing my account of thermal substances several years ago, 
I am often presented with two sorts of questions. These are questions of 
origin and questions of individuation.
Let’s take the question of origin. How did the first thermal substances 
come into being in the early universe? What process combined the quarks, 
electrons, and photons into stable, thermal substances? And, if the first 
thermal substances were formed by some congealing of fundamental par-
ticles, doesn’t that entail that there was either a time in which there were 
no substances at all or a time in which particles were substances?
This question presupposes the very bottom-up imperialism that I am 
taking pains to deny. The first thermal substances did not form by some 
conglomeration of fundamental particles. Rather, thermal substances 
were there at the very beginning. If the universe is finite in extent (a 
so-called closed universe), then I would expect that a single thermal sub-
stance emerged from the Big Bang, a thermal substance at a cosmic scale. 
As time passed, the original thermal substance decomposed into ever 
smaller substances, first at the scale of galaxy clusters, then at that of 
galaxies, then solar systems, and finally planetary components. Particles 
have always had only virtual presence within substances.
I think that the same top-down perspective would restructure our 
inquiry into the origin of life. Instead of thinking of the original organ-
isms as resulting from the clumping together of molecules in a pond, we 
should look first at the whole pond, or indeed at the whole solar system. 
The original organisms must have resulted from the partial disintegra-
tion of some larger pre-organic system, a system that encompassed the 
precursors of both the population of living things and their environment. 
Similarly, we shouldn’t think of multicelled organisms as resulting from 
the clumping together of one-celled organisms, but rather as the breaking 
off of multicelled organisms from a pre-existing community of simpler, 
less differentiated life.
Let’s turn next to the questions of individuation.7 How many thermal 
substances are there? How are they individuated? For instance, is the earth 
a single substance? The lithosphere of the earth? The mantle, core, or 
crust? Tectonic plates? Mountain ranges? Rocks or pebbles? Homogenous 
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crystals? Or are all of these mere groups or heaps of substances? How 
many substances do the world’s oceans contain? Or the earth’s atmo-
sphere? How many substances occupy interplanetary or interstellar space?
In my view, these are open, empirical questions. We cannot settle them 
from the armchair or by careful phenomenological examination of ordi-
nary experience. We need to develop full theories of collective phenom-
ena. The study of such phenomena (which physicists term “emergence”) 
is still in its infancy. It is only in the last 40 years or so that sustained 
investigation into these matters has been undertaken. Hylomorphism can 
be helpful, by ruling out facile, microphysicalist answers, answers that 
suggest that there is nothing fundamental or deep to study here, since 
everything is supposedly reducible “in principle” to microphysics. Ernest 
Rutherford is reported to have said that all of science is either ‘atomic 
physics or stamp collecting’ Such microphysical imperialism relegates all 
the “special” sciences to second-class status, simply arranging on the page 
facts that are fully explained only by so-called fundamental physics.
If hylomorphism true, each of the special sciences is equally funda-
mental. The world cannot be captured in microphysical terms alone. The 
natures and accidents of thermal substances and organisms do not even 
supervene on the character and arrangement of micro-particles. (This is 
consistent with admitting that no macroscopic change can occur without 
concurrent microscopic change.) As we descend to the quantum scales, 
things become less definite and more dependent, and not the reverse. It is 
actually finite, “realistic” quantum physics that is non-fundamental, since 
there are no “quantum substances” per se, but only quantal aspects (acci-
dents) of thermal substances and organisms. The role of particle physics is 
simply to provide the base models from which the truly realistic, infinite 
algebras of quantum chemistry and thermodynamics can be built, char-
acterizing the essences of thermal substances (both actual and virtual).
How big can thermal substances be? Thermal substances in principle 
can exist at any scale, from single particles (or even fraction of a particle) 
to the entire cosmos. I conjecture that very small substances are quite 
short-lived – substances in the late stages of corruption or the early stages 
of generation. Very small substances can perhaps be sustained in labora-
tory conditions. In the wild, they will, I think, generally be much larger.
In the absence of empirical inquiry, I can’t answer the questions about 
the individuation of thermal substances with any confidence, but I can 
suggest some criteria for individuation:
1. Sharp boundaries or discontinuities, in both space and time (i.e., 
sharp transitions) are a necessary condition for distinguishing two 
thermal substances. But such boundaries may not be a sufficient 
condition. Some thermal substances (like perhaps convection cells) 
might include some internal boundaries. Nonetheless, where there 
are no sharp boundaries, where there is perfect continuity in 
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temperature, chemical composition, and density, we should count 
the continuum as contained by a single, enduring substance.8
2. Strongly collective powers are a necessary condition for substantial 
unity, both at a time and through time. A substance must have 
causal powers, both active and passive, that do not supervene upon 
and so are not determined by the powers and arrangements of its 
parts. As we have seen, this condition is met by all bodies with 
chemical and thermodynamic properties. Again, such strongly col-
lective powers may not be a sufficient condition for substantial unity 
at a point in time: it could be that a group of substances possesses 
some strongly collective powers, over and above the powers of the 
individuals. This happens in the case of human societies, for 
example.
3. The complete absorption of the causal powers of parts is a sufficient 
condition for substantial unity at a point in time. Partial absorption 
of powers results in groups, not in the per se unity of a substance. 
In contrast, the parts of a substance are so completely absorbed 
into the nature of the whole that they cannot simultaneously belong 
in the same way to two distinct wholes.
6.  Irreducible Powers of Organisms
How do organisms fit into the world of thermal substances? Thermal sub-
stances have a virtual presence within an organism. These virtually present 
thermal substances correspond to actual quantitative parts of the organ-
ism, contributing to the explanation of the causal powers of those parts. 
Consequently, there is a metaphysically fundamental difference between 
inorganic water (for example) and water as it exists in organisms, although 
clearly inorganic water can play a role of material causation or explana-
tion in relation to organic processes, even if organic and inorganic water 
are empirically indistinguishable in their chemical actions. The chemical 
properties of the water have different metaphysical explanations, depending 
on the kind of substance (thermal or organic) to which it belongs.
The chemical and thermodynamic properties and the associated causal 
powers that the quantitative parts of the living body possess are partly 
determined by the soul, the substantial form of the body, along with the 
holistic accidents of the organism, like perception or thought. The inter-
action is not one of action/passion, as between two substances, but top-
down formal determination. Nonetheless, changeable mental attributes 
can make a real difference to the operation of bodily parts, and vice versa. 
The soul can guide the breaking of microscopic symmetries, imposing 
asymmetric accidents on the results, without requiring any novel force 
(such as Bergson’s élan vital) or violation of conservation laws.
Is there immanent teleology in nature outside of human thought and 
intention? Thomists and other Aristotelians argue that the answer is ‘Yes’. 
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In fact, whenever a thing acts according to its intrinsic power and potenti-
alities, immanent teleology exists (Rota 2011). Fundamental causal pow-
ers as Aristotle conceives of them are inherently teleological. To have the 
power to produce E in circumstances C is to have the C-to-E transition 
as one of one’s natural functions. Indeed, as George Molnar (2003) has 
pointed out, the ontology of causal powers builds intentionality into the 
very foundations of natural things. To have a power is to be in a kind 
of intentional state, one that is in a real sense “about” the effects one is 
predisposed to produce.
On the Aristotelian model, biological teleology requires just two things: 
a robust causal powers metaphysics and real causal powers at the level of 
biological organs and organisms. Such real powers require, in turn, sub-
stantial forms at the level of whole organisms. The substantial form of an 
organism is called its soul (psyche). In nonhuman animals and in plants, 
the soul is nonrational. Human souls possess additional rational powers, 
powers of scientific understanding and deliberation about the good.
This emergence of new powers at the macroscopic, biological scale 
should be unsurprising, given the fact that, according to our most recent 
quantum mechanical models, we see strong (ontological) emergence at 
the mesoscopic scale in solid-state physics and chemistry. Mesoscopic 
systems, like ferromagnets, superconductors, and Bose-Einstein conden-
sates, all exhibit dynamical behaviors that are irreducible to the micro-
states of the constituent particles, namely spontaneous symmetry breaking 
and thermodynamic irreversibility. In a similar way, we should expect 
the biological functioning of organisms to be irreducible to the chemical 
and thermodynamic facts about the virtual thermal substances that cor-
respond to their actual quantitative parts.
Evolution itself presupposes teleology in the very idea of reproduction, 
and so evolution requires irreducible causal powers at the organismic 
level. No organism ever produces an exact physical duplicate of itself. 
In the case of sexual reproduction, the children are often not even close 
physical approximations to either parent at any stage. An organism suc-
cessfully reproduces itself when it successfully produces another instance 
of its own biological kind. This presupposes a form of teleological realism, 
since biological kinds are individuated teleologically, that is, in terms of 
their fundamental causal powers.
Richard Dawkins has suggested that we think of organisms as mere 
“robots” that our DNA molecules have “programmed” for reproducing 
themselves (Dawkins 1976, xxi). In fact, DNA molecules never succeed 
in producing perfect physical duplicates of themselves, and even if they 
did, the mere physical duplication of the molecule would not constitute 
reproducing oneself. Suppose, for example, that an eccentric billionaire 
builds a chemical factory that does nothing but fill barrels with copies of 
his own genome, launching them into deep space. No one would think 
that such a man had succeeded in procreating trillions of descendants. A 
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DNA molecule counts as a copy of one of one’s genes only when it is suc-
cessfully fulfilling the function of a gene within a living organism, indeed, 
within a living organism of the appropriate teleologically defined kind.
Alexander Pruss and I have argued that functionalist theories of mind 
require an account of normativity (Koons and Pruss 2017). The argument 
can be extended to functionalist accounts of biology. The functional dis-
positions that are supposed to be definitive of mental or biological states 
can only be defined relative to the normal state of the organism, where the 
“normality” involved is a normative notion, not merely a matter of aver-
ages or actual frequencies. There are two prima facie plausible accounts 
of the natural basis of normativity: Aristotelian powers and evolutionary 
accounts.
An Aristotelian can give a straightforward account of such normativity:
A substance is supposed to produce E on occasions of C if and only 
if its nature includes a C-to-E power.
The other potential source of normativity is evolutionary selection. 
For example, Ruth Millikan attempted define normality in terms of 
adaptations:
If a system x belongs to a reproductive family F, then x is supposed 
to produce E under circumstances C if and only if doing so is one of 
F‘s adaptations.
This seems to be the most promising alternative to the Aristotelian 
account. However, such evolutionary accounts are highly vulnerable to 
hypothetical counterexamples. Pruss proposed (in Koons and Pruss 2017) 
the thought experiment of the Great Grazing Ground: a hypothetical 
world in which organisms in our history were maximally proficient in 
reproduction, thanks to the intervention of benevolent aliens. In such a 
world, even if the causal path leading to each of us were identical to the 
actual historical path, none of us would be conscious, since no distinc-
tion between normal and abnormal states could exist. Without that dis-
tinction, the relevant functional states supposedly defining consciousness 
could not be instantiated.
Pruss’s thought experiment brings out very vividly how Millikan’s 
definition of biological teleology fails to capture any form of immanent 
teleology. The present function of an organ or organelle depends on her 
definition on remote facts in the past, and even on past facts that are 
causally unrelated to the present. If human thought and intention depend 
on the teleology of the human body, then thought and intention are also 
extrinsic to our present constitution and operation, which is incredible.
As I mentioned in Section 2, an Aristotelian account of organisms pro-
vides clear advantages for epistemology. Take, for example, our perception 
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of secondary qualities. Unless we are perceiving real qualities in nature, and 
qualities that really are as we perceive them to be, all of our empirical knowl-
edge is vulnerable to skeptical challenge. Microphysicalists cannot suppose 
that secondary qualities (as we perceive them) are real, since scientific theory 
has no place for any counterpart to color, smell, and so on at the micro-
physical level. In contrast, hylomorphists can suppose thermal substances to 
have fundamental powers of mutual interaction that correspond closely with 
the appearance of color, sound, and odor. The quantum-level interactions 
of particles are less, rather than more, fundamental than these chromatic, 
acoustic, and olfactory interactions between thermal substances. Organisms 
have evolved fundamental passive powers of responding reliably to these 
active powers, resulting in veridical perception of the qualitative features 
of inorganic substances. This provides a metaphysical foundation for J. J. 
Gibson’s (1979) ecological theory of color, rehabilitating the “secondary” 
qualities to first-class status.
Anti-realists about secondary qualities could object that the hylomor-
phic view fails to secure the veridicality of color perception, since colors as 
they appear to us are categorical (non-dispositional) and non-relational, 
while the qualities of thermal substances are merely powers to affect 
other substances. But in a causal-powers ontology, the activation of a 
causal power is a categorical and intrinsic property of its bearer. When 
we perceive the color of a substance, we are perceiving an accident of 
action, the actualization of a corresponding power to act. An accident of 
action can both be intrinsic to a substance and make essential reference 
to something beyond it. The critic is right in thinking that colors as we 
perceive them are not perceived as the actualization of something relative 
to us, but as the actualization of a mind-independent feature. That aspect 
of our phenomenology is preserved in the Aristotelian account, since the 
qualities involve powers to act on both inorganic thermal substances and 
our sensory organs.
But is the Aristotelian account of organisms compatible with the facts 
of biological evolution? Wasn’t Aristotle committed to the eternal fixity 
of the species? In fact, the fixity of species is no more central to Aristotle’s 
system than is the constancy of the celestial spheres. Aristotle’s natu-
ral philosophy depends on the existence of individual substantial forms 
and on the existence of relations of objective resemblance between those 
forms, resulting in a nested, species-genus structure of taxonomy. All of 
these features are fully compatible with (and even partly explained by) 
the theory of evolution. And, as I argued earlier in this section, evolution 
actually depends on the existence of organismic substantial forms.
In principle, there would be no problem for hylomorphism even if every 
biological individual were ontologically sui generis. And the transition 
from one species to another is not a problem. Aristotle recognized that 
the environment plays a role, along with the parents, in every case of 
reproduction: “man and the sun beget man” (Physics ii.2, 194b13).
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But Aristotle’s theory does require a principled distinction between sub-
stantial forms and mere accidents, and a neo-Darwinian theory would 
seem to blur that distinction, supposing that the essence of a biological 
individual consists of nothing but the accumulation of favored accidents. 
Darwinian evolution depends on a pre-existing genetic variety within spe-
cies, which corresponds (in Aristotelian terms) to the members’ possession 
of contrary contingent accidents. As a new species emerges, what had been 
mere contingent accidents take on new functions, enabling the organisms 
with those accidents to better exploit some ecological niche. Therefore, it 
seems, at least prima facie, that all evolutionary change involves merely 
changes in the distribution of accidents within related populations. Where 
is the need for the substantial form and its essence?
For Aristotelians, the distinction between substantial form and accident 
depends on a set of asymmetric explanatory relations. A substantial form 
explains the organism’s potentiality for certain accidents, and not vice 
versa. This is compatible with neo-Darwinian theory, which is silent on 
the explanatory priority between biological forms.
For hylomorphists, there is a traditional distinction between “proper” 
and contingent accidents. An accident is proper (a proprium) if it flows 
from the specific nature of the substantial form; otherwise, it is contin-
gent.9 Among contingent accidents, some are permanent (like sex or 
handedness) and others are changeable. The permanent but contingent 
accidents are explained by the combination of the nature of the substan-
tial form with certain contingent facts about the process by which the 
organism was generated and originally developed. Changeable accidents 
are explained by combining the nature of the substantial form with con-
tingent facts about the subsequent history of the organism.
Now, the crucial question is: can the Aristotelian explain how some 
accident could be a contingent accident of an ancestral form of the organ-
ism but a proper accident of the organism itself (or vice versa)? Doesn’t 
this require a sharp, un-Darwinian transition between one generation (for 
which the accident is contingent) and the next one (for which the accident 
is proper)?
Not necessarily. It could be that during evolution a population comes 
to realize (unstably) substantial forms that belong simultaneously to two 
distinct species. The substances in such a population would have two, 
contrary propria, each one a differentia of a different species. Each mem-
ber of the population would be abnormal relative to one or both of its 
species, lacking one or both of the contrary propria. Relative to one spe-
cies, the accident is permanent but contingent, and relative to the other it 
is proper. In such a population, there would be an unusual and unstable 
overdetermination in the explanation of the possession of certain proper 
accidents. The presence of a proper accident that is a differentia of one of 
the two species would be explained twice over: once by direct implication 
from one of the specific natures of the substantial form and in another 
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way by contingent factors in the substance’s generation and development 
that result in the organism’s deformation relative to the other species. The 
transitional organism’s substantial form would have a natural disposition 
toward both contrary differentiae. This would be an unusual situation but 
not an impossible one.
Alternatively, even if it were true that each organism must belong to a 
unique species, this would not create an insuperable problem for reconcil-
ing Aristotle and evolution. We could suppose that transitional popula-
tions consist of a mixture of two species, with members of each species 
able to mate with the other, and with offspring of both species possible 
from a single pair of parents.10 The coexistence of distinct species would 
reflect the fact that the population stands on a borderline between two 
competing explanatory schemes. Some organisms will fall on one side of 
the boundary or the other, due to its particular configuration of accidents.
Eventually, selective pressures could eliminate the representation in the 
population of the older species, completing the origin of a new species, 
which would eventually become reproductively isolated. The Aristotelian 
concept of species would not perfectly coincide with modern biological 
uses in evolutionary settings, but the correspondence would in general be 
quite close.
7.  Conclusion
Aristotelian pluralism carves a middle path between atomism and cosmic 
monism, securing a foundation for the manifest image of human life. 
It acknowledges the homeliness of the world – a place in which human 
freedom, agency, and knowledge can exist without threat of nihilism or 
corrosive skepticism. Modern science seemed to threaten this world with 
a universal acid of atomistic reductionism, but the implications of the 
quantum revolution enable us to set the world right again.
Notes
1. See, for example, Lewis (1947, chapter 2), Plantinga (2010, chapter 10), 
Koons (2017, 2018c), and Steward (2012).
2. I side here with Thomas Aquinas (and, I believe, with Aristotle himself) 
in affirming the “unicity” of substantial form: that is, the thesis that every 
substance has a single substantial form. Some contemporary theorists (e.g., 
Jaworksi 2016) side instead with Scotus and most later scholastic philoso-
phers in allowing for multiple substantial forms. They face what I take to be 
a decisive objection: if the substantial form is that by which everything in the 
substance (both material parts and accidents) receive their actual existence, 
then multiple substantial forms would introduce an unacceptable form or 
overdetermination or redundancy in nature.
3. My views about the role of matter have changed significantly from my 2014 
paper (Koons 2014). I now think that matter’s role as an enduring substrate 
through change (emphasized in Aristotle’s Physics) is secondary to its more 
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central role as individuator. I now think of the persistence of matter through 
substantial change as non-fundamental, as the persistence of a kind of ens suc-
cessivum (a series of fundamentally distinct, time-bound entities that are tied 
together into a kind of causal sequence). Thus, I have moved somewhat in the 
direction of Scaltsas (1994) and Marmodoro (2013). However, unlike Scaltsas 
and Marmodoro, I still believe that there are real and not merely conceptual 
distinctions among a substance, its form, and its matter. The three must be 
really distinct in order to play three distinct explanatory roles in metaphysics.
4. In the GRWm ontology, parcels of material “gunk” do have definite loca-
tions, but particles are not part of the fundamental ontology.
5. The Drossel-Ellis account, like GRW, involves objective quantum collapses, 
but in their account the collapses are precipitated in a top-down fashion by 
thermal properties of the system.
6. To be absolutely complete, I would have to add heaps of groups and groups 
of groups to the list.
7. These were pressed at an American Catholic Philosophical Association meet-
ing in 2019 by physicist Stephen Barr.
8. Is the existence of sharp boundaries an ontological or merely an epistemologi-
cal condition? That is, could there be two thermal substances in contact with 
each other, where the boundary in space (or time) is merely a metaphysical 
boundary but not a physical or chemical discontinuity? If such were possible, 
it would be difficult for us to detect the existence of two adjoining thermal 
substances, as opposed to a single one. Perhaps we could use facts about the 
past or future history of the substances to make the distinction, relying on 
empirical laws of the generation and corruption of thermal substances.
9. Although propria are fully explained by a substance’s essence, it is possible 
for a substance to lack one of its propria, through genetic defect or injury. 
Being bipedal is a proprium of human nature, but not all human beings have 
two legs in fact.
10. It is important to note that metaphysical species do not necessarily correspond 
one to one with what biologists mean by “species”. Biologists use a number 
of criteria to distinguish one species from another, and none of these criteria 
will always carve nature at the joints, metaphysically speaking. Nonetheless, 
just as new species in the various biological senses arise by descent with 
modification, the same must be true of metaphysical species.
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